“I do not agree that
we are understaffed
in the area of
emergency response.”

(Zeb Nash, ExxonMobil Site Manager, Baytown,
June 6, 2006)



Why is ExxonMobil reducing the number of qualified process technicians available to respond to an emergency?
 

As the result of an ExxonMobil in house developed emergency response analysis process, on February 9, 2006, in the Northwest Chemicals Section (NWC) outside process technician staffing numbers were reduced.  Hourly employees working within the NWC area felt that the reduction in shift team staffing numbers placed themselves and the surrounding community in harms way when it came to being able to safely and effectively respond to unplanned operating unit upset conditions.  One hundred percent of the hourly work force employed at NWC supported this contention by signing a circulated petition which was later presented to members of the Baytown management leadership by the United Steelworkers Union.  Copies of the petition have as well been provided to officials of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ).
 

“We the undersigned (hourly employees trained and qualified to work the Northwest Chemicals operating units and loading rack facilities in the Baytown Chemical Plant) disagree with the company’s implementation of reduced staffing levels as a result of a February 9, 2006, DERR analysis.  We believe that by the reduction of two full time emergency response positions, our safety is being compromised by ExxonMobil at the expense of putting the continuing escalation of profits over people.  The sheer amount of equipment, the nature of safely handling toxic as well as hazardous materials associated with these operating units and the coordinated activities that are essential to responding to unit emergencies are but a few of the reasons that make these reduced staffing efforts by ExxonMobil irresponsible.  Due to what will result in substantially lengthened response times to unit emergencies, not only does this staffing reduction effort affect our personal safety, but the safety of our neighbors in the surrounding community and the integrity of the environment.  ExxonMobil management views the risks associated with reduced staffing levels as “acceptable.”  In response to NWC unit employees’ safety concerns regarding the reduced staffing levels, the NWC business unit manager stated, “If you do not like the company interpretation of the DERR analysis you might want to consider seeking employment elsewhere.”  Statements of this nature to employees voicing legitimate safety concerns clearly demonstrate a conscious indifference by NWC line management in this important safety related matter.  We the undersigned do not feel that the risks associated with this reduced staffing are acceptable for our own personal safety nor for the safety of our surrounding community and environment.”

Why has ExxonMobil not learned anything from BP’s poor safety record?
 

At a December 22, 2005, town hall meeting held in Texas City, TX, involving an Independent Safety Review Panel chaired by former Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III, a number of BP employees were in attendance to address the panel.  Lloyd Jewel, a BP worker with 22 years of experience, commented to the inquiry panel that “BP management refuses to utilize us as hourly employees as an asset.  We tell management that things are broken and they refuse to fix it.”  Mr. Jewell also conveyed the fact that BP hourly employees had specifically voiced safety concerns to their site management around equipment which ultimately was involved in the March 23, 2005, explosion which led to 15 workers at the facility needlessly losing their lives.  Had BP management listened to their hourly workers with all of their years of valuable hands on experience could the March 22, 2005, tragedy possibly have been prevented?  Will BP management in the future take a more active approach in listening to their most valuable asset….their hourly workers?  Why is ExxonMobil willing to risk a BP type incident in this case by not hearing the voices of the NWC process technicians?
 

Why were ExxonMobil’s profits for the 3rd quarter of 2006 $10.5 billion, and yet they cannot adequately staff operating units for proper emergency response?
 

Four NWC hourly employees were asked by management to participate in the emergency response analysis process.  These same four workers were repeatedly characterized by management personnel during the course of the analysis as the “unit experts.”
 

Ultimately management participants involved in the analysis formulated one viewpoint on appropriate staffing levels with the hourly participants viewing those levels as insufficient in nature for adequate emergency response purposes.  Despite the “expert” hourly input, management decisions were arbitrarily made to implement reduced staffing levels at NWC.
 

Following are employee comments extracted from a Texas City BP safety and environmental site independent survey dated January 21, 2005.  This survey was conducted subsequent to three substantial safety incidents and PRIOR to the March 23, 2005, explosion and resulting loss of life.  The telling portion of this is that one of the three noted incidents involved worker fatalities.
 

            “As operators we are concerned with the continued reductions in staffing and our ability to run the units safely.  None of the operator   concerns have been addressed since the BP take over; constant reductions of every kind everywhere; constant reductions in benefits, what gets recognized is reductions of any kind.”
 

           “I would allow the operators to get the proper amount of operators on each shift; they are clear that they do not staff for emergencies, but since they are not keeping up the repairs and such we really live from emergency to emergency – the difference is the nature and impact of the emergency.”
 

As ExxonMobil employees and citizens of the surrounding community, are we setting ourselves up with the NWC revised staffing levels to suffer through a tragic event similar to BP?


Why is ExxonMobil making a daily profit of $117 million, and still saying it can’t afford two qualified unit personnel for emergency response?
 

BP employee, Lloyd Jewel, commented to the eleven member James A. Baker III, Independent Panel in December of 2005, that at the BP Texas City facility “Safety is for sale.”  While it is felt that a statement of this nature would not be totally applicable at the ExxonMobil Baytown site, in this instance of staffing reduction at NWC hourly employees obviously feel that company implemented decisions have crossed the line in the areas of safety and environment.  The company impetus to reduce the staffing level is obviously nothing more than a cost cutting measure.  All ExxonMobil employees support the need for the company to remain competitive and make a healthy profit.  Nevertheless, we as Union represented employees do not understand nor support cutting staffing levels at the expense of health, safety and the environment.
 

Why doesn’t ExxonMobil care about the safety of Baytown residents?
 

The time is at hand for the residents of Baytown and the surrounding communities to send a resounding message to ExxonMobil Corporation that their right to manage their facilities where health, safety or the environment is being breached is not absolute.  Hourly and management employees jointly participated in an analysis to determine emergency response staffing needs at the NWC operating units.  In the end, ExxonMobil Baytown site management chose to ignore the perspective of the very people they themselves recognized as experts; NWC unit process technicians with decades of experience.  Prior to initiating this current communication effort for the benefit of the public sector, every conceivable effort was made to resolve this reduced staffing issue through well established in house safety systems… to no avail.  Current existing federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations do not address staffing levels in petrochemical facilities.  As well, federal nor state environmental regulations address staffing levels.  When ExxonMobil initiated decisions have the potential to impact the health, safety and environment of employees and citizens residing in surrounding communities it is time to start asking the tough questions.
 

Why has ExxonMobil not lived up to its legal obligations to the city of Baytown?
 

In the state of Texas, petrochemical facilities are granted air permits by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) as a condition of operation.  In instances where unplanned operational unit upsets occur and it becomes necessary to utilize a flare stack, a facility has an allotted amount of time to burn a flare prior to reaching a point which is deemed as a Reportable Quantity (RQ.)  Once an RQ is reached or exceeded, it is mandatory for a facility to file a written report with the TCEQ on specified chemicals and their volumes which was released into the flare system.  Depending on circumstances surrounding any given flaring excursion, the environmental agencies may determine that citations are in order.  Even though flares may appear to be harmless in nature to those not familiar with petrochemical operations, in reality during times that flares are burning at high volumes toxic materials are being emitted into the workplace and surrounding communities.  This condition is especially heightened in instances where heavy visible smoking is present.  Naturally the primary goal of ExxonMobil should be to avoid operational conditions where use of a flare stack becomes necessary.  But when operational unit conditions do generate the need for flaring, every effort should be utilized to terminate the flaring event in as an expedient manner as possible.
 

In many instances getting a situation back into normal operational patterns can greatly depend on availability and response times of trained and qualified outside unit personnel.  During the NWC emergency response analysis, hourly and management participants equally shared the position that in instances where flaring becomes necessary it should be an elevated priority to extinguish the flare.  Hourly participants became somewhat stunned when at a point during the analysis process management representatives took a position that once any given flaring event reaches or exceeds the RQ, the sense of urgency to terminate the flaring event becomes diminished.  In other words, once reportable to the environmental agencies, it is ExxonMobil’s attitude that it is acceptable to continue to pollute.
 

NWC hourly employees clearly voiced, as outlined in the signed petition, that future unplanned flaring events associated with their operating units under current reduced staffing levels carries a heightened possibility of being unnecessarily prolonged.  ExxonMobil’s demonstrated attitude as is related to this manner of operational strategy serves as a blatant legal as well as moral disregard to families residing and earning a living in the city of Baytown and surrounding communities.  Once again it is clearly time for the citizenship and elected officials to begin asking the tough questions of ExxonMobil Corporation.

 

01/10/07